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All governments of the developing countries intervene
in their economies. In the past, economists have done
little more than list interventions, commending those
that confirm to their own ideological precepts and
condemning those that do not. Recently research has
been undertaken with the aim of filling this void and
providing systematic studies of government behaviour
and its consequences. The following article reports
one such attempt.
The research focused on South Korea (Korea
hereafter) and was concerned with the choice and
absorption of modern industrial technology imported
from abroad [Enos and Park forthcoming]. To neither
the Korean economists and engineers engaged in the
research, nor the one foreign economist, did it seem
remarkable that the Korean Government took part in
the process of adoption of foreign techniques; but to
the latter, acquainted with the participation of
governments of several other developing countries,
what did seem remarkable was that the Korean
Government took part throughout the process, and to
good effect.
Continuous and competent intervention by the
Korean Government in major economic activities
appears to be the rule rather than the exception. Both
those inside government and those in the private
sector accept that the national interest should be fully
represented and that its representation should require
the government's active participation. To use a
theatrical idiom, the government is always to be on
stage, filling all the roles for which its talents equip it.
Dramatically, it is the ever-visible protagonist.
In this article three points will be made: first, that the
adoption of sophisticated techniques requires the
continued attention of one economic agent over a
substantial length of time; second, that in Korea the
government has been that agent; and third, that our
understanding of the effects of government inter-
vention in the economic affairs of developing
countries is quite inadequate. In illustrating these
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points one case will be drawn upon repeatedly, that of
the adoption of imported techniques in the petro-
chemical industry.
History of Petrochemical Development
The chronology of the petrochemical industry in
Korea begins in the early 1960s when the government
conceived of an integrated petrochemical complex,
supplied with ethylene, the chief raw material, from a
plant located at a planned petroleum refinery. The
petroleum refinery was completed in 1967, and the
ethylene cracker was included in the Second Five Year
Plan, 1967-71. Planning for the petrochemical
complex proceeded concurrently, with separate
studies of the types of petrochemicals to be
manufactured, their scales of operation, alternative
industrial structures and organisations of firms, and
availability of (foreign) techniques. Coordinating the
studies was the government's Economic Planning
Board; the studies themselves were carried out by
various ministries and state enterprises, by the US aid
agency and by foreign consultants.
Having made certain policy decisions - that
petrochemicals should be produced employing the
current state of the art in the developed countries, by
means of joint ventures with foreign firms, one
product to each firm - the Korean Government in
1968 initiated negotiations with all foreign firms, in all
developed countries, capable of supplying the
technology. Many suppliers were approached; 13 and
nine for polyethylene and vinyl chloride monomer
(VCM) respectively, and similar numbers for the other
petrochemicals. The government's vehicle in the
negotiations was the Chungju Fertiliser Company
(subsequently the Korea General Chemical Cor-
poration), which had been established with US
government aid and which then operated two plants.
constructed eight and six years previously. Chungju
was chosen to represent Korea because it employed
the nation's largest group of chemical engineers,
whose experience was necessary in evaluating the
technical and economic terms of any foreign offer.
With the exception of those for one product,
caprolactum (the raw material for nylon), the
negotiations between the Korean Government and the
foreign suppliers proceeded in a similar manner, with
the government imposing increasingly stringent
conditions until all but one of the foreign contenders
had dropped out. With the remaining foreign firm the
government signed a contract for the provision of the
technology; the arranging of finance; the training of
Koreans as technicians, engineers and managers; the
supervision of design, construction and initial
production in the petrochemical plant; and the
organisation and responsibilities of the joint venture.
For caprolactum, the government was not able to
negotiate what it felt to be satisfactory terms for ajoint
venture, so it decided to license a foreign design and
itself undertake all the other activities - financing,
training, production and management.
After the contracts had been signed in 1968 and 1969
the chief responsibility for their performance devolved
from the Chungju Fertiliser Company to the joint
ventures (called Korea Pacific Chemicals in the case of
the firm producing polyethylene and VCM) and to the
Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Although the
staffs of these two entities were of different status,
those of the former being employees of a semi-public
firm and of the latter being civil servants, their
superiors were drawn from the same elite, namely the
military officers and technocrats surrounding the
President of the Republic. The top administrative
officer of Korea Pacific Chemical Corporation, for
example, had previously been a general in the Korean
army.
By the time the Third Five Year Plan 1972-76 was
published, work on the petrochemical plants was well
under way. The signing of the contracts with the
foreign suppliers had been followed by the designing
of the plants, the training of the Korean engineers, the
ordering of the capital equipment, the preparation of
the sites, the construction of foundations, buildings,
workshops, laboratories, and housing, and the
installation of the equipment. Approximately 10 years
after their conception, and five years after the
completion of negotiations, the petrochemical plants
began operation.
Persistent Intervention
But just as the Korean government's concern did not
end with access to the technology so it did not cease
with the onset of production. The Heavy and
Chemicals Industries Ministry, created to administer
those activities laid out in the Third Five Year Plan,
oversaw the operation of the joint ventures,
facilitating the delivery of raw materials and spare
parts, assigning prices and markets for the output, and
assuring fulfilment of the conditions of the contracts,
particularly with regard to the utilisation of capacity.
The Ministry also intervened in cases of emergency,
for example when there was an explosion at one of the
plants. Intervention then took the form of expediting
the procurement of replacements for the equipment
destroyed (supplied domestically rather than, as
originally, from abroad) and putting pressure on the
joint venture swiftly to resume production.
Apart from its regular activity of overseeing the
operations of the petrochemical manufacturers, the
Korean Government has subsequently made three
major interventions. The first of these was after steady
and profitable production of petrochemicals had been
secured, when the government floated its half share of
the joint ventures on the Korean share market, thereby
transferring ownership to its private citizens and
raising some of the capital to finance the next round of
petrochemical investments.
The second intervention took place in the establish-
ment of the second petrochemical complex, at
Yeocheon in the south-west. There, six years after
production began at Ulsan, operations began on a
larger scale; before this the Korean Government had
once again negotiated contracts with foreign suppliers
of technology, in the main those with whom it had
come to agreement in the course of the first set of
negotiations.
The third major government intervention occurred in
1982 when one of the foreign suppliers, by then
engaged in two joint ventures, one each at Ulsan and
Yeocheon, became dissatisfied with its role and with
the benefits it was receiving. After negotiations, a
court suit, and still more negotiations the foreign
participant, Dow Chemical Company of the USA,
agreed to sell its share of the assets of the companies to
the Koreans, so that these enterprises became wholly
national.
One observation that can be drawn from this history is
that the government's influence has persisted. From
the conception of a national petrochemical industry in
the early l960s, through the choice of suppliers of the
sophisticated technology, the specification of the
conditions under which the technology was to be
provided, the construction and operation of plants,
and the expansion of capacity, to the change of
ownership in 1982, the Korean Government has been
continually on the scene. Throughout the whole 20
years of its existence the industry has received the
constant attention of the government. To be sure,
administrations have changed, responsibilities have
been shifted from one department or one ministry to
another, personnel have retired or moved on, but the
government has stayed, omnipresent. No other actor
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A view of the Nam Hay chemical plant at Yeosu.
- foreign financiers, capital goods suppliers,
producing firms, providers of the technology - has
been always on the stage. The financiers enter early
and soon leave, the capital goods manufacturers
participate from time to time, the producing firms
come into being only after their legal and operating
environments have been established, and the tech-
nology suppliers may depart some time afterwards:
the Korean Government remains on hand.
'Remaining on hand' describes adequately the
presence of the Korean Government throughout the
process of adopting technology, but misses the other
characteristic that it has displayed, namely deter-
mination. The government has always been to be on
the spot, intervening whenever this seemed to be in the
public interest. Both those who intervened and those
in whose affairs intervention took place appeared to
accept as legitimate the government's continual
presence. Whether it was formulating and imple-
menting policy, monitoring performance, rewarding
success or punishing failure, the Korean Government
was felt to be fulfilling its duty to the nation.
The word which best captures this overt acceptance of
the constant playing of the major role in the process of
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industrialisation is persistence. As our research has
shown, the Korean Government has persisted in
planning, in setting policy, in negotiating, in
organising, in overseeing, and in intervening, at every
stage during the adoption of foreign technologies; the
research of some others whose scope has been broader
than ours indicates that the Korean Government has
also persisted in planning, policy-making and
implementation elsewhere in the economy [Ho 1981;
Jones and SaKong 1980; Wade 1982].
The National Interest
Persistence is one of three attributes which together
account for the relative success of the Korean
government's interventions in the economy; the other
two are patriotism and primacy. To the (non-
Japanese) foreigner the Koreans, old and young, rich
and poor, rural and urban, privately employed and
civil servants, are remarkable in their awareness of a
national interest and in using this national interest as a
guide for their own behaviour. In the material sphere
the national interest is furthered by the construction of
a modern industrial economy, involving the adoption
of the best of foreign technologies and institutions,
and employing all the talents and industry of its
citizens. In outline there is nothing unusual about this
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statement: one encounters paraphrases in almost
every developing country. What distinguishes Korea
from most of the others is that the statement is not
rhetoric; it is heartfelt, and it motivates actions.
Koreans, government officials included, will work
harder, will subordinate themselves, will make
sacrifices, to attain the national good.
Translated into economic attitudes, patriotism leads
to the acceptance of production targets as reasonable
outcomes, of government institutions as legitimate
instruments, and of commands directed towards the
attainment of targets and issued by public officials as
justifiable directives. Leaders are quick to order, civil
servants are quick to implement and producers are
quick to obey when the performance of the economy is
at stake.
Translated into economic decisions patriotism leads
to choices that are recognised to be in the public
interest, against alternatives that bring greater private
rewards to the decision-makers. Development econo-
mists in other countries are accustomed to seeing
alternatives chosen which bring the greatest tribute to
the country's leaders and their subordinates, which
yield the greatest amounts of scarce foreign exchange
to the capitalists, which cause the fewest disturbances
in the existing economic and political order, ie,
alternatives in which the personal preferences of the
decision-makers override the national interest. No
such choices were observed in the course of our
research in Korea; in no case where there was an
obvious conflict between personal and national
interest had the former triumphed.
The Primacy of Government
If by patriotism in government we mean the
subordination of the politician's and the civil servant's
private interests to the acknowledged objectives of the
nation at large, by primacy we mean the independence
of the same individuals from pressures which would
deflect them from attaining these objectives. In Korea,
unlike most other developing countries, one does not
find extra-governmental forces - wealthy families,
ethnic or tribal or regional groups, multinational
flrms, etc - controlling government. No particular
interest need always be considered in the determination
and implementation of public policy. No civil servant
need temper his recommendation or command because
of its likely effect on a favoured party. Issues are more
clearcut. decisions and actions are swifter, where
government is supreme.
Maintaining primacY appears to be a constant concern
of the Korean Government, requiring vigilance and a
willingness to cut down to size, dissolve or even
destroy any other force that becomes excessive. Con-
fluets may arise between the attainment of an economic
target and the growth of power or wealth of the agent
which produces the targeted goods; in such situations
lower priority may be attached to the economic than
the political objective. The national interest may not
suffer, however, if the extra-governmental force,
strengthened by the accretion of power or wealth,
would have been able subsequently to substitute its
own objectives for those of the nation. Reducing the
scope for the representation of private preferences
may be in the public interest.
Assessing the Impact of Public Intervention
That the Korean Government has intervened in the
economy is not in question; what is questionable is
that the intervention has been useful. To prove that
government action has benefited an economy is
impossible, since one cannot tell how the economy
would have performed had government not intervened.
The counterfactual case cannot be appraised.
In the absence of controlled experiment one has to rely
upon comparisons between actual performance, on
the one hand, and typical or standard performance, on
the other. Comparisons involving the entire economy
are often made, comparisons from which Korea, with
its high rate of growth of output and relatively even
distribution of income, emerges successfully. Such
comparisons are so general, however, that they do not
enable one to distinguish between the effects of
government actions and the effects of all other
influential factors - in Korea's case the legacy of
organisation and skills from the recent liberation from
colonial status, the post-1950 military and financial
contributions from the USA, the constant challenge
from North Korea and the discipline and diligence of
the Korean people. Perhaps the most one can conclude
from such macroeconomic comparisons is that
efficient, incorruptable government dedicated to
economic development is a necessary condition for
success, a rather bland statement although one with
some empirical support eg Adelman and Morris
1967].
The particular contribution of government may be
more visible when the comparisons involve micro-
economic phenomena. Relevant government notices
and actions can be more easily identified, and their
consequences traced through. Or a specific micro-
economic outcome can be focused on, and those
government policies and actions which affected this
outcome can be determined. Political and admini-
strative scientists prefer the first of these approaches,
economists the second, since they can then select
outcomes expressed in quantitative terms.
In our research we selected three measurable
outcomes of the process of adopting technologies one
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organisational, one output-centred, and one input-
centred, which together seemed to give some
indication of the degree of Korea's success.
The organisational measure was the percentage of
Koreans in the total number of engineers engaged at
each stage of the absorption of a new technique. The
data tor the two petrochemical techniques involved in
the production of polyethylene and VCM are given in
the table below.
The data reveal that there were a sufficient number of
engineers in Korea to fill the bulk of the operating
posts, hut not enough initially to carry out the more
highly skilled jobs of design and procurement.
Between the preparation for the first plant at Visan
and the second at Yeocheon, however, some Koreans
were trained to carry out these functions too. In
comparison with petrochemical operations in other
developing countries the percentages in Table I are
quite favourable to Korea.
The output-centred measure was two dimensional, the
first being the speed with which facilities were brought
to full-capacity operation and the second, the
percentage by which design capacity was subsequently
exceeded. Exceeding design capacity is often possible.
for engineers tend to be conservative in their sizing of
equipment. but the extra output is won only when
those operating the equipment have come to know
thoroughly its capabilities.
In the case of the two petrochemical plants at the
Ulsan complex the rate of output reached design
capacity in six months and 40 months for polyethylene
and VCM respectively. By 1978. five years after initial
operation, polyethylene output exceeded design
capacity b 35 per cent, and VCM by three per cent.
These also are enviable figures by the standards of
plants employing sophisticated techniques in develop-
ing couiltries.
Source: Luos iud Park. toriheoming
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The input-centred measure of the success in adopting
imported techniques is also multidimensional, since it
attempts to determine the productivity of the various
inputs, singly and collectively, in producing output.
The productivities that could be measured in the case
of petrochemicals were the separate ones of raw
material and energy, and the aggregated one of total
factor productivity. (The productivity of fixed capital
increased in direct proportion to the increase in output
from the equipment.) Over the period from the
attainment of full-scale production in 1973 until the
end of 1976, three years later, the productivity of raw
material (chiefly ethylene) and energy use each
increased at ai) annual rate of approximately 0.6 per
cent. During this period average cost of production
(ie, the inverse of total factor productivity) fell by three
per cent annually.
To put these improvements in perspective, mt is
necessary to provide standards. The two percentages
quoted above start from the attainment of full-scale
production. and hence are improvements upon design
costs'. Few plants in developing countries employing
sophisticated techniques ever reach design standard
for the petrochemical plants in Korea to have met
design standards, let alone improved upon them, is a
substantial achievement. None of Dow Chemical's
identical plants in other countries surpassed these
achievements, and their two plants in developing
countries. l-long Kong and Chile. were inferior in
terms of productivity of new materials and energy, and
of total factor productivity.
in these terms - the surpassing of design capabilities
with steady improvements in efficiency - Korea can
he said to have successfully adopted petrochemical
manufacturing technology. How much of this success
is a result of the policies and actions of the Korean
Government remains a vexing question. We cannot
even state that the Korean Government contributed
more to the development of its petrochemical industry
Table I
Percentage of Korean engineers among the total engaged in the adoption of to petrochemical techniques
Design 6 o 50
Securing of finance O 33
Procurement 5 t) 40
Cons t ru et ion 25 72 76
Start-up 27 67 67
Operation 46 91 91
percentage Korean
s lacre of total nuiiiher U/san p/ant Yeocheon p/ant
adoption engaged (/970-77) (1975-79)
than did those of Hong Kong and Chile, the two less
successful examples. The three countries have adopted
identical techniques from the same supplier, but
similarities may cease with the technology: the
behaviour of the other economic agents involved -
the construction ñrms, the producing firms, the
bankers - may have differed so substantially as to
explain all the variation in success.
Nevertheless, we were able to identify sorne specific
actions of the Korean Government which helped
assure success. Considering the first measure of
success, the organisational factor, the replacement of
foreign engineers by Koreans was facilitated by the
government's policies of a) concentrating university
resources in the teaching of engineering (four out of
every 10 graduates of Seoul National University, the
nation's chief institution of higher education, are
engineers); b) requiring the provision by the firms of
housing and other social amenities for their
technically skilled employees (with the desirable
consequence of maintaining a core of experienced
personnel); and e) negotiating with the foreign
technology supplier strict terms broadening the
employment and training of Koreans.
Considering the second and third measures of success,
those centred upon the production of output and the
utilisation of inputs, the government's chief contri-
bution seemed to be indirect, through assuring that
raw materials and other inputs were available in the
amounts necessary to operate equipment at full
capacity. The direct contribution of the government
was to put pressure on the petrochemical manu-
facturers to operate at full capacity. Summarising, in
Korea, a country whose economy was becoming
increasingly integrated, the government judged
performance in terms of achievement of output
targets. relying mainly upon physical and organi-
sational controls, rather than financial controls, as the
means to its end.
Even if one accepts that the Korean Government has
aided the growth and improved the performance of the
nation's petrochemical industry or, more extensively.
of the nation's economy, one is still left ignorant otlthc
extent of the government's contribution. Important it
may have been, but just how important! Importance,
after all, ranges from slight influence lo necessity;
there is nothing in our results that would permit us to
locate a single point within the range. Our inclination
would be to place the Korean government's
contribution toward the further, more influential
extreme, but this is a subjective valuation. In the
specific case of petrochemicals. we would wish to have
as much information about the petrochemical
industries in other countries and about their
governments' roles before we made a firm judgement.
This desire for comparative data from other
developing countries is a general one. Where
technology is a crucial factor, as it is in almost all
modern industries, data from different countries will
never be comparable unless they are generated in
production processes employing identical techniques.
Only if technology is constant can the effects of
differing factors such as government policy and action
be evaluated. That all variables other than the one
under consideration should be held constant is too
demanding a prescription for research in developing
countries, but that the variable technology should be
held constant is not too demanding, since it occurs in
fact.
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